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«IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL EUROPE, THE EURO WILL DIE.
THIS DEATH COULD TAKE MANY FORMS 
AND THERE MAY BE MANY DETOURS ALONG THE WAY.
IT COULD BE AN EXPLOSION, AN IMPLOSION, A SLOW DEATH, 
A DISSOLUTION, OR A DIVISION.
IT COULD TAKE TWO, THREE, FIVE, TEN YEARS, AND BE PRECEDED 
BY A LARGE NUMBER OF REMISSIONS, WHICH, ON EACH OCCASION, 
GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WORST HAS BEEN AVOIDED»2. 
«THE PURPOSE OF THE UNION IS NOT TO BRING AN END TO THE 
NATIONAL STATE, BUT RATHER TO STRENGTHEN THOSE STATES 
AS VIABLE DEMOCRACIES, GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF LAW AND A HIGH 
LEVEL OF SOCIAL WELFARE. WE MUST EXTRICATE OURSELVES FROM THE 
SIMPLE CHOICE THAT SOME WISH TO IMPOSE ON US WHEN IT COMES 
TO THINKING ABOUT EUROPE: EITHER A FEDERAL STATE 
OR A FREE TRADE ZONE»3.
The underlying federalist ambitions of the Communi-ties/European Union integration process are well-
known. The period from immediately after the 2nd World 
War to the moment when the Communities were formed 
in the 1950s was particularly rich in terms of these unifi-
cation ideals. However, once achieved, they also fell short 
of their proponents’ most ambitious expectations. But 
this does not mean that they had no impact on the path 
of European integration at relevant moments. This was 
visible not only at the moment of its foundation but also 
in the period immediately following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the end of the Cold War. In these cases, federal 
ideals had a marked influence on several of the mecha-
nisms created by the Maastricht Treaty, notably the crea-
tion of the Euro. With the current crisis, which started in 
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2007/2008, we have seen a new wave of ideas and propos-
als of a more or less federalist bent at the national polit-
ical level, from European institutions, as well as from 
think tanks and academic experts. Indeed, calls for the 
need for «more Europe» and a «European economic gov-
ernance» to resolve the current financial and economic 
crisis have frequently come from various national and 
political circles.
In the case of Portugal, there seems to be consensus 
among the main political forces that increasing the Euro-
pean Union’s competences (namely through a «European 
economic governance») is a suitable and necessary way 
of solving the current crisis. However, it is not clear what 
this kind of solution would entail, notably in relation to 
the distribution of competences and powers at the national 
and European level, or what their long-term implications 
would be for member states – and Portugal in particular 
-  and the actual European Union. This reflection therefore 
aims to identify and analyse some of the main federalist-
type proposals and/or measures that have been advanced: European economic govern-
ance, banking and fiscal union, European bonds/Eurobonds, etc. It is also our aim to 
try to assess what a more economically integrated European Union would consist of 
specifically, given that a federal-type economic solution, whatever it may be, would first 
have to be a political solution. 
To this end, the methodology used will be based on bibliographic and documental 
research, complemented by a comparative method. We start with a short analysis of 
classic political federalism models (the United States in 1787, Switzerland in 1848), as 
well as economic and monetary federalism, highlighting the case of German unification 
in the 19th century. We will then review the model used in current European integration, 
which can be qualified as integration by stealth4. This is followed by an analysis of some 
of the most relevant proposals on this subject in recent years from European institu-
tions, think tanks and scholars, etc.. Lastly, a comparative method is adopted to discuss 
and assess the viability of the proposals of a «federal upgrade» in the European Union, 
both in relation to classic federal models and the already existing experience of European 
integration. The analysis will be completed with a short discussion on the foreseeable 
impact of such a solution from a Portuguese perspective.
THE CLASSIC FEDERALISM MODELS5
There is extensive literature on federalism. The works published by Dimitrios and Wayne6 
and Burgess7, among others, provide a broad picture of the federalism problematic, 
das Comunidades/União Europeia 
desde o seu início. Com a atual crise 
iniciada em 2007/2008 temos assistido 
a uma nova vaga de ideias imbuídas 
sobretudo de um federalismo econó-
mico. Todavia, não é claro em que 
poderia consistir uma solução deste 
tipo, nomeadamente em termos de 
repartição de competências e poderes, 
entre a UE e os Estado-membros. O 
objetivo deste artigo é identificar e 
analisar algumas das principais pro-
postas e/ou medidas de cariz federa-
lista que têm sido efetuadas para 
resolver a crise da Zona Euro. Por 
outro lado, tentaremos também avaliar 
em que poderia consistir uma União 
Europeia mais integrada economica-
mente, numa lógica próxima do fede-
ralismo económico, bem como 
discutir as suas implicações e riscos 
para o Estado português.
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, Crise 
económica, Federalismo, Portugal.
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namely in terms of concepts, theories, case studies, and current trends. Rather than 
reviewing this literature here8, we will make a brief and very selective look at some 
examples of classic federalism, from both the political and economical stance. Closely 
following Andreas Føllesdal9, federalism can be defined as the theory or defence of 
federal principles for the division of pow-
ers among political units and common 
institutions. Unlike a unitary State, sover-
eignty in federal political orders is not 
centralised but is based on at least two 
different levels. The units at each level have 
their own authority and, in certain areas, may be self-governed. The political obligations 
and rights of citizens are therefore guaranteed by two different authorities. The division 
of power between the political units and the centre may vary. The centre usually exercises 
power over defence, foreign policy and finance. The political units may also participate 
in the decision-making process of the central bodies. 
Typically, but not necessarily, a federal State is the result of a merger between several 
states or political units that were previously autonomous. In general, they are small or 
medium-sized states or political units that renounced or were forced to renounce their 
full sovereignty and form a new, larger, political unit. The federal solution may also 
result from the transformation of a central and unitary State (usually a large territory) 
to a model with a different internal organisation and division of powers that confers 
extensive autonomy to its regions and provinces. In this case, the process involves shared 
internal sovereignty, with regions or provinces being called federate states or another 
equivalent designation. This is usually referred to as a «false federation» or «imperfect 
federation»10, as it does not result  from the joining of political units which had previ-
ously been sovereign. Federal Germany, founded in 1949 after the 2nd World War, is an 
example of this situation in Europe. It succeeded the centralised Germany of the 3rd Reich 
and the not so decentralised Weimar Republic. (However, there had been several sover-
eign political units at moments in history before the unification in 1871). Whatever the 
case, the federal State is the only one that exercises sovereignty externally (foreign pol-
icies, diplomacy, and armed forces are exclusive spheres of the federal State). 
It is not always easy to define the boundaries of a federation compared to other similar 
units, such as confederations. In theory, the political units that are part of a confed-
eration – the sovereign States – essentially maintain their sovereignty and, as a matter 
of principle, may voluntarily abandon the confederation. Typically, a confederation is 
based on common interests that lead to their joint sovereignty in certain fields (for 
example, defence in foreign affairs, and trade in domestic matters). It should be noted, 
however, that there can be quite different forms of confederation, which can range from 
being similar to a federation with a mere intergovernmental cooperation agreement.
Returning to the federation case, the most studied examples of classic federalism are 
UNLIKE A UNITARY STATE, 
SOVEREIGNTY IN FEDERAL POLITICAL ORDERS 
IS NOT CENTRALISED BUT IS BASED 
ON AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS.
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probably those of the United States of America, in 1787, and Switzerland, in 1848. 
It should be noted that these two historical examples of federations occurred in very 
different circumstances to those currently found in the European Union. Federation in 
the United States came in 1787, as mentioned above, and took place over a short eleven-
year period after independence in 1776. Among other specific circumstances of the 
time, the population of the then thirteen British former colonies totalled less than three 
million inhabitants. A relevant aspect is that there was not much difference in the size 
and heterogeneity of the political units that formed the federation in 1787. The most 
populated State, Virginia, had 538,000 inhabitants vis-à-vis 45,000 in the least popu-
lated, Rhode Island, representing a difference of 1 to 12 in these two extremes. This, 
however, was exceptional, with the difference falling to 1 to 6 between the second larg-
est State and the last but one, and 1 to 3 between the other States in general11. It is also 
important to note that none of the thirteen former colonies had any long-standing 
sovereign State-nation tradition when they decided to transform the confederation into 
a federation. When Switzerland evolved to a federation in 1848, replacing the medieval 
Helvetic confederation with the modern federal Switzerland, the size of the population 
was similar to that of the thirteen British colonies that founded the North American 
federation in 1787. 
Turning to political institutions, what are the typical features of a federal State’s insti-
tutions within these two models of classic federalism, particularly in the case of North 
America? One of the most characteristic political features is the existence of a bicameral 
parliament, based on a balance between the small and large federate units. The first 
parliamentary chamber prevents the large, less numerous, federate units from being 
dominated by a coalition formed by the smaller units. On the other hand, the second 
parliamentary chamber tries to protect small political units from hegemony by the larger 
units. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, within this classic federalism, 
equality among representatives was facilitated by the fact that the differences were 
relatively small due to the small size of all the federate units.
Another typical characteristic of the North American federal model is the institution of 
presidential government; this seeks to function as a strong link for the whole group with 
direct democratic legitimacy conferred at the ballot by the majority of the federation’s 
citizens. The Swiss case was also influenced by the North American bicameral model, 
which was incorporated into the Swiss Constitution. Its most original element is seen in 
the Federal Council, the federation’s executive body, for which consensus among the main 
parties is the basis of government. And so a tradition from the times of the Helvetic 
Confederation has remained in place; moreover, the federal State’s competences are 
reduced to the minimum. Legislative power is essentially in the hands of the cantons. 
This leads to a distinction from the Helvetic model that is common practice in direct 
democracy: the use of a referendum to ratify changes to the constitution or on other 
political matters considered of such importance that they require citizens’ direct approval12.
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We not turn to the economic dimension of federalism by examining the historic exam-
ple of German unification in the 19th century, notably its monetary unification. Before 
analysing this aspect, it is important to stress that the German unification of the 19th 
century was not a voluntary and peaceful accession process like that of the Communi-
ties/European Union, which was also only possible after the tragedy of the 2nd World 
War. Diplomatic manoeuvring and war 
played a crucial role in the creation of the 
German federal State in the 19th century. 
The word realpolitik, commonly used in this 
period, captures the spirit of the time. The 
formation of the German Reich in 1871 took 
place under the conquering leadership of 
William I of Prussia and Otto von Bis-
marck, who originally brought together twenty seven previously independent States, 
of which Prussia was the largest. These States (Staaten or Bundesstaaten), in other words, 
federate states, were given the name Länder during the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), 
and it remains the term today. 
From an economic-monetary perspective, the change in currency and monetary policies 
in the different states to a single currency and central bank, the Reichsbank, was an inter-
esting aspect of the 19th century German federal model. The move from monetary sov-
ereignty to a common authority raised several problems. At the time, the loss of 
seigniorage income13 from the states that had become part of the federation had a huge 
impact, particularly on the resources of smaller states. Today, this is generally no longer 
an issue, except in the case of economies affected by high inflation, where the power to 
issue currency can be considered a kind of « hidden seigniorage tax». The circulation of 
bank notes is another substantial difference with that of the economy today; at the time, 
it was almost marginal and the circulation of coins was much more widely used. Bank 
notes did not have the same legal tender as today; they were used mostly to facilitate 
business payments, in other words, they were generally seen as credit instruments. 
In addition to these differences resulting from the economy’s characteristics at that 
time, other interrelated aspects should be noted that are of greater relevance to today. 
The first, which is worth remembering again, concerns the creation of a political and 
economic federation in Germany in the 19th century – a process which was far from 
equalitarian or devoid of power struggles. Quite the contrary, the supremacy of the 
northern states, particularly Prussia, was visible in the design of the federation and in 
the bureaucratic-administrative state machine. To give an example: Friedrich List, the 
main theoretician of the customs union and German industrialisation, advocated a central 
bank to issue bank notes for the Zollverein group. What in fact happened was that the 
Prussian government, eager to maintain monetary control, followed a different course. 
It started by creating an exclusively Prussian central bank in 1847; it was only later, after 
FROM AN ECONOMIC-MONETARY PERSPECTIVE, 
THE CHANGE IN CURRENCY AND MONETARY 
POLICIES IN THE DIFFERENT STATES 
TO A SINGLE CURRENCY AND CENTRAL BANK, 
THE REICHSBANK, WAS AN INTERESTING ASPECT 
OF THE 19TH CENTURY GERMAN FEDERAL MODEL.
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the political unification in 1871, that this became the Bank of the Empire in the Reichs-
bank in 1876, as a clear symbol of its supremacy over the federation. 
The second is that the Prussian and northern states’ dominion gave rise to major eco-
nomic and cultural-religious cleavages between Protestants and Catholics. The latter 
were the object of a Kulturkampf (culture war) driven by the protestant and Prussian elite 
that dominated the State. Max Weber’s well-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, published in 1905, to some extent reflects those deep-set divisions in Ger-
many a century ago. 
The third aspect concerns the use of this federal model for analogies with the current 
European economic and monetary unification. The comparison is not evident without 
taking into consideration the previous political unification – in the case of Germany in 
the 19th century but not in the European Union in the 21st century. As João Ferreira do 
Amaral pointed out, «contrary to what happened in the European Union, German mon-
etary integration took place two years after the political unification (in 1871, and the 
German monetary union took place in 1873). Although this aspect made all the difference, 
it was underestimated by federalism, which continued to believe that the historic role 
played by the Euro would be to create conditions for the political unification of Europe14.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTEGRATION BY STEALTH 
The federal ideas that influenced the construction of the Communities/European Union 
can be simply grouped under two theoretical approaches: that of Jean Monnet, and 
Altiero Spinnelli’s approach. That of Monnet, the French businessman, is characterised 
by its essentially pragmatic character and is not explicitly federalist. Above all, it opts 
in favour of advancing economic integration with the aim of ultimately triggering a 
spill over effect. This will lead to even greater economic integration which will require 
federal solutions and political institutions. The latter approach, championed mostly by 
the Italian left-wing politician, Spinnelli, is openly and explicitly federalist and advocates 
that federal solutions  and political institutions should be adopted without waiting for 
the spill over effects of the economy. In fact, there is a certain scepticism about the 
possibility that the strategy to move towards economic integration may, in the future, 
generate a spill over effect that will lead to a federal political union.
Although the Communities/European Union is not a federation of states comparable to 
either of those analysed above, historically it echoes classic federal and other ideas. This 
is clearly the case within the European Union institutions, namely those with a suprana-
tional profile, such as the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The case 
of Altiero Splinelli is emblematic. He was a member of the Commission consecutively 
from 1970 to 1976, and later a member of the European Parliament from 1979 to 1986. 
But the Court of Justice is the most interesting and possibly least well-known aspect (except 
in legal areas) of the federalist ambition pervading European institutions. An article by 
Eric Stein written over thirty years ago on the role played by this institution in the creation 
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of a transnational Constitution, through jurisprudence, clearly showed this tendency15. 
In fact, the case of European Union Law, in which historically the role of establishing the 
interpretation and application of the Court of Justice is enormous, is an example of what 
can be called integration by stealth16. This expression suggests the idea that integration is 
made by elite groups, backstage, almost furtively and away from the public eye. 
It would be no exaggeration to say that the cases of Van Gend en Loos versus Dutch Tax 
Administration (1963) and Flaminio Costa versus Enel (1964) are permeated with legal 
federalism; the former in establishing the direct applicability principle, the latter in 
drafting the also jurisprudential principle of the primacy, or precedence, of the union’s 
rule of law over national law. Nevertheless, neither of these principles is the direct and 
unequivocal result of the European Treaty texts. This jurisprudential formulation became 
dominant because it was generally accepted by the doctrine and national judges, and 
away from the eyes of public opinion. However, it does not completely set aside the 
possibility of contestation. Ultimately, the question of primacy would only be closed 
with a provision similar to the one in the abandoned European Constitutional Treaty 
project. Its article I-6 explicitly stated the following: «When exercising the competences 
granted, the Constitution and the law adopted by the institutions of the Union take 
precedence over the law of the member states». In other words, if it had been approved, 
the precedence of the primary law (Treaties) and secondary law (legal acts by the insti-
tutions) over any national rule, including the Constitution, would have been unequivo-
cally established in writing.
In fact, this provision was one of the few that, for one reason or another, was not 
included in the current European Union Treaties (EUT) and the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU), in the text of the Lisbon Treaty. This was very 
probably for political reasons. It suggests an integration strategy that has been followed 
far from the eyes of public opinion. Such a provision – one that anyone initiated in 
matters of European Union Law can easily understand – would have clear political 
implications. The ordinary citizen would then «find out» that the Law of the Union 
prevails over any national regulation, even a constitutional ruling. Although this would 
not be a problem in some member states, in others, where public opinion is more 
Eurosceptic or there is greater scrutiny of European processes, it would probably be 
difficult to accept for political reasons. The option was to continue the integration away 
from the public eye, as has been the case so far. By not including this provision in the 
Treaties, it avoided a delicate political problem for governments. Using this subterfuge, 
they managed to sidestep the thorny issue of having to explain absolute primacy over 
national law to national electors. However, contrary to what a lay citizen might think, 
the solution obtained through jurisprudence is basically very similar: it has the advan-
tage of working in a «closed circuit» and being reserved to experts with a European-
federalist ideology. The article by Majone17 on this specific European political culture 
and the fear of how citizens vote in referendums is one such example.
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THE USE AND ABUSE OF MONETARY INTEGRATION
As well as legal federalism and the jurisprudence interpretation of the Treaties, mon-
etary integration is another interesting case of influence by federalist ideas. This aspect 
is mainly linked to the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) initiated 
with the Delors Plan in 1988 and which culminated with the adoption of the Euro as 
physical currency on 1st January, 2002. Upon 
the creation of the EMU, it was established 
that member states wishing to participate 
in this process would have to comply with 
a set of rules, usually known as nominal 
convergence criteria. The aim was to ensure 
that they met all the necessary conditions 
to participate in the Euro without putting 
its good operation at risk. With this in 
mind, among other requirements that had 
to be met – namely in terms of full liberalisation of the movement of capital and the 
independence of the central bank from governments – the following rules were deter-
mined: budget deficit no more than 3 per cent of GDP; an accumulated public debt not 
exceeding 60 per cent of GDP; inflation below the average of the three countries with 
the lowest rates, plus 1.5 per cent; long-term interest rates no more than the average 
of the three countries with the lowest rates, plus 2.0 per cent; exchange rate within the 
range of appreciation/depreciation admitted by the European Monetary System (EMS). 
In theory, these were sine qua non conditions for the Euro. The reality was different18. 
A flexible interpretation of these economic targets prevailed. In terms of accumulated 
public debt, for example, the criteria of not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP was replaced 
with a benevolent interpretation: it was enough to be reasonably close to this figure 
and show a downward trend in the accumulated public debt. As for the exchange rate, 
theoretically the criterion was that it had remained permanently within the narrow EMS 
band in previous years, with the maximum possible exchange depreciation/reapprecia-
tion rate of 2.25 per cent. However, this was also subjected to a more flexible evaluation 
(varying up to 15 per cent). As regards the deficit not exceeding 3 per cent of GDP, 
although most countries met (or nearly met) this requirement, European institutions 
were not concerned about (or were prevented from being concerned about...) the sta-
tistical method used to reach this figure. Apparently, at the time, the European Com-
mission and Eurostat did not see the lack of statistical rigour or the dubious manner 
in which the actual national public accounts were presented as being problematic. 
Nevertheless, as we now know, systematically resorting to extraordinary revenue, pri-
vatisations, pension funds, etc., off-budget expenses and the questionable use of finan-
cial derivatives – at the time creating the illusion of a balanced budget and controlled 
public debt – were devices some States used freely.
AS WELL AS LEGAL FEDERALISM  
AND THE JURISPRUDENCE INTERPRETATION  
OF THE TREATIES, MONETARY INTEGRATION  
IS ANOTHER INTERESTING CASE OF INFLUENCE  
BY FEDERALIST IDEAS. THIS ASPECT IS MAINLY 
LINKED TO THE CREATION OF THE ECONOMIC  
AND  MONETARY UNION (EMU) INITIATED  
WITH THE DELORS PLAN IN 1988.
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To some extent, this explains how Club Med countries19 were able to be part of the Euro 
from the start. At the time, there was no shortage of specialist literature warning of the 
risks of weak economies (which had chronic difficulties with their public accounts) adopt-
ing a strong common currency. The very idea of a common currency in the European 
Union was questioned by some economists, especially North Americans. The better known 
of these are Paul Krugman and Milton Friedman, two economists with very different views 
on the economy and from very different political backgrounds. Taking substantially dif-
ferent perspectives (Krugman with a Keynesian perspective, and Friedman neoliberal), 
both believed that the requirements for an optimum monetary area20 in the European 
Union were not in place. For example, at the start there were no requirements on free 
movement of the workforce, generalisation of preferences, a suitable common budget, 
etc., so that the advantages of a common currency would clearly outweigh the disadvan-
tages. In light of the Europeans’ general distain at doubts raised about the success of the 
Euro, Krugman now speaks of a «vengeance of the optimum monetary area theory»21.
What is the explanation for the flawed architecture of the Euro? And the ineffective 
rules for access to and remaining in the Euro? Was it technical and/or political inepti-
tude? Excessive optimism about the future creation of an optimum monetary area? Was 
the Euro being used as leverage for a federal-type political union? Any careful analysis 
shows that the project to create the Euro had significant shortcomings from the outset. 
The most obvious has already been pointed out: the requirements for an optimum 
monetary area were not verified. Such an intrinsic weakness should in itself have been 
a warning for a more careful, differently configured process, or, should that not be 
possible, delaying or even dismissing its adoption. To make matters worse, the con-
vergence criteria outlined were often bypassed, especially by the Club Med/PIIGS coun-
tries22. Were the European decision-makers unaware of these risks? Probably not, but 
it is likely they were underestimated due to a set of intellectual and political constraints 
linked to the manner in which the European construction is usually viewed. 
Knowing the population’s resistance to the federal idea, the European leader elite sought 
to overcome this by using strategies such as economic integration with the dual aim 
of acting also as an instrument for political union. In this way, the successive advances 
in economic integration – customs union, common market, the Euro, etc. – as proposed 
by Jean Monnet, would also be used to trigger a spill over effect for political unification 
– in diplomacy, common defence, in a federal-type budget and taxation, etc. According 
to João Ferreira do Amaral, this was actually one of the main motivations for the crea-
tion of the Euro. He notes that supporters of European federalism «trusted that the 
need to make the monetary union work would mean that federal institutions would 
have to be created (such as a single central bank, for example, and an adequately-sized 
European budget) [...]. Thus, no sooner had the single currency been created, they 
invested in approving a European constitution with a federal bent for this purpose, 
prepared by a convention similar to some historic cases of forming a federal State »23. 
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The intellectual atmosphere in which «Europe cannot stop» – to use the common polit-
ical-mediatic jargon – linked to the preliminary concept that «more Europe» is always 
good, were determinant factors towards the decision to create the Euro. In fact, the 
ideologically contradictory coalition that supported its creation can only be understood 
by taking this intellectual atmosphere into account, which worked as an obstacle to 
critical thought in the political debate. «In fact, the single currency was only created 
because (the initially highly unlikely) convergence between the federalist and the neo-
liberal views was possible in the 1990s, and was on the rise in areas connected to busi-
ness and economic policy-making bodies»24. In the end, the idea that the single currency 
could implicitly help attain political union seduced the European left-wing parties with 
marked pro-federal affinities, which therefore accepted the «creation of monetary union 
institutions that reflect the main neo-liberal conceptions». The problem that resulted 
from this was that the whole macro-economic adjustment tends to be «made at the 
expense of labour (by increasing unemployment or decreasing salaries)» with this 
configuration of the Euro. Furthermore, «the survival of the so-called social European 
model is put at risk, a possibility welcomed by neo-liberalists as they believe the Euro-
pean social model is not compatible with globalisation».
Despite agreeing with the diagnosis of the failure of current European economic govern-
ance, the proponents of a federal solution for the European Union naturally put forward 
another interpretation, and above all, another solution. This is the case of Jean-François 
Jamet25, who defends that a European economic government, based on budgetary federal-
ism, is the best way out of the current crisis in the Euro area. As for the weakness of the 
current European economic and monetary architecture, Jamet describes it as: «The crisis 
has revealed this model’s weaknesses both in terms of its effectiveness and legitimacy. Faced 
with recession and the added risks of sovereign and bank insolvency, it was the European 
Central Bank (ECB) that played the stabilising role. But this entailed going beyond its 
mandate by buying part of the public debt of States in difficulty, for example, notably to 
stop speculation over the Italian debt»26. Furthermore, the «member states’ economic coor-
dination policies and budgetary rules lost credibility, either because they were not enforced, 
like for example the budgetary rules of the Growth and Stability Pact, or because the insti-
tutional tools were not adapted to a crisis situation (the Union’s budget is not in itself 
enough to have a significant relaunch effect, and budgetary and fiscal decisions require 
the unanimity of member states and, therefore, long diplomatic negotiations), or because 
they simply listed objectives without defining an obligation of means», as in the Lisbon 
Strategy. According to Jamet, the inability to resolve this crisis is essentially due to what 
he qualified as being the weakest and most «decentralised [part] of the European economic 
crisis». This added a «political uncertainty and even a feeling of economic impotence and 
uncertainty», that made it impossible to «prepare a clear common urgent strategy in 
response to the crisis». Jamet concluded that «Europe did not know how to communicate 
in a united voice, nor extend the right level of solidarity and control among member states».
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THE ALTERNATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT/ 
ECONOMIC FEDERALISM 
We now examine the current economic governance model, and what it consists of besides 
its monetary aspects. As expected, it results in part from the above-mentioned European 
preference for integration by stealth, with its ensuing consequences, including that of its 
questionable democratic legitimacy. But before our critical analysis, we will review its 
fundamental features and also take a close look at the presentation made by Jamet27. He 
states that the current European economic governance «has been characterised by the 
compromise between the joint management of a limited number of competences, a power 
to regulate under common negotiated rules, and an invitation to coordinate the policies 
based on national decisions». Jamet talks of three domains in which this model is used, 
the main features of which are described below.
The first domain is that of competences centralised at a European level; these are typically 
«technical» matters that come under the responsibility of an independent supranational 
institution. It is the case, for example, of the ECB in monetary policies; the Court of 
Justice in controlling the enforcement of legal regulations within the European Union; 
the Commission in areas related to the customs union and common market (trade policy 
and competition policy, for example), «redistributive policies» such as the economic and 
social cohesion policy, or policies addressing concerns such as self-provision, food safety, 
and the farming community’s standard of living (the common agricultural policy). These 
last two policies absorb the bulk of the EU’s budget (over 80 per cent of total expenditure), 
which represents about 1 per cent of the GDP of EU28 countries as a whole. This is the 
quintessential domain of European technocratic governance in which government matters 
are «depoliticised», and taken to an extreme in the case of the ECB with its status as totally 
independent from the democratic power of national governments.
A second domain of European economic governance is that of ensuring national policies 
are coherent with a specific set of rules negotiated among the member states. Examples 
of these are the previously mentioned budgetary rules for the Eurozone, which sought to 
prevent quite distinct national policies putting the common currency at risk. The idea of 
further solidarity if there were any budgetary difficulties was also implicit. Note that these 
are not legal regulations subject to jurisdictional control by the European Union’s Court 
of Justice; they are political provisions, only subject to political control by the member 
states through the Council. Linked to this is what could be considered a third domain of 
European governance of «weak regulation»: the coordination of national policies through 
non-binding objectives on competitiveness and employment matters (for example, R&D 
expenditure of around 3 per cent of GDP, as foreseen in the Lisbon Strategy).
As this was the economic governance model at the time of the 2007/2008 crisis and 
there is broad consensus that it was unable to respond to a crisis of this size and grav-
ity, it raises the question of alternatives. The main proposals have been that of moving 
towards a banking and fiscal union, issuing Eurobonds, and, in more general terms, 
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European economic governance. Our focus goes to this last proposal as it is the most 
ambitious and has the greatest impact. Before assessing its merits or shortcomings, it is 
important to understand what European economic governance means. The first problem 
is that the use of the concept has taken various shapes and forms. Originally, the term 
was used by François Mitterrand in around 1990 after the presentation of the Delors Plan 
when the first phase in the creation of the Euro began. At the time, it was primarily a 
kind of slogan for the European Union used in French politics. Meanwhile, it re-emerged 
in the context of the current crisis. As Jamet pointed out, one decade later the German 
chancellor, Angela Merkel, started using the term but now shaped by her government’s 
vision on how to solve the European crisis28. Essentially, European economic governance 
is therefore now understood to be «a strengthening of the rules for budgetary discipline 
linked to the use of more automatic control mechanisms ». This perspective has to a great 
extent been the inspiration for a number of directives and regulations proposed by the 
Commission and voted by the Parliament and the Council. Among others, it includes the 
creation of the European semester29, which allows for the Commission and the Council 
to issue opinions on proposals for national budgets. The idea of European economic 
governance underwent further developments. In the summer of 2011, Germany and France 
introduced a clearly political dimension to the debate. They proposed the creation of «a 
Council of Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone, which would meet twice a 
year, and be headed by a stable presidency for two and a half years ». Former ECB Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Trichet joined the debate by stating his preference for «a confederal 
government with a confederal finance minister, who could assure the governance of the 
Eurozone and enforce this or that decision». How would this European economic govern-
ment be put into effect? Various proposals were made. One was that there would be a 
common Presidency of the Commission and European Council, headed by the same 
person. Another was that the European Commissioner for economic and financial matters 
would also chair the Council (of Ministers) meetings on economic and financial affairs 
(ECOFIN). The aim would be that the European Union would «express itself with one 
voice in international institutions, as is already the case in the WTO through the Com-
missioner for International Trade».
According to Jamet, these proposals for European economic governance have two main 
flaws: they «do not link national parliaments and they do not endow this government 
with resources for its own budgetary intervention ». He adds that the first flaw could be 
overcome if the «national parliaments and the European Parliament were linked to the 
European semester and the European decisions on budgetary matters» by «creating an 
interparliamentary conference linking representatives of national parliaments and Euro-
pean Parliament » for example, as proposed by the well-known pro-federalist member of 
the European Parliament, Alain Lamassoure30. As for the second flaw, the solution would 
be an «increase in European budgetary capacities, which could take various forms: fund-
ing investment projects through European loans (project bonds), creation of a European 
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treasury and joint issuance of part of the member states’ debt (Eurobonds) – most likely 
with a bonus-malus system to reward States with better budgetary behaviour, increase in 
the European budget, or increase in the loan capacity of the European Investment Bank ». 
While aware of the advantages of this solution, Jamet recognises that it would be difficult 
to put into practice. In his own words, it is in the «area of the increase in the European 
budget capacities that, technically and politically, advances will be most difficult to accept». 
He does, however, point out that the crisis is slowly pushing the EU towards « a grow-
ing federalisation of economic policy», which can cause problems as it is being done 
«without any previous design or sufficient political legitimation».
CONCLUSION: THE RISKS OF AN ECONOMIC FEDERALISM SOLUTION
We now turn to analysing the advantages of a solution of European economic federalism 
as described above from a Portuguese perspective. This implies two major risks from the 
outset, not to mention the question of democratic legitimacy, which for the purposes of 
simplicity we do not analyse herein. The first risk is intrinsically Portuguese and derives 
from the economy’s inability to grow significantly over the last fifteen years. Going back 
further in time, it should be recalled that at the time of Portugal’s adhesion to the Euro-
pean Communities on 1st January 1986, the Portuguese currency – the escudo –, like the 
Spanish peseta, was left out of the exchange mechanism. Preserving exchange sovereignty 
was not  a political choice but was due to the weakness of both economies. Portugal’s 
entry in the EMS, at the same time as Spain, 
came later at the end of the 1990s, when the 
system became more flexible in terms of 
exchange rate fluctuations. However, it had 
been Portugal’s aim since the launch of the 
EMU to participate in the creation process 
of the Euro. Successive Portuguese govern-
ments established it as a «national goal», 
more important than political divisions 
domestically. As a result, the Portuguese 
economy was  able to meet – statistically at 
least – most of the required nominal convergence criteria. Partly on its own merit, 
and partly because of the above-mentioned flexible interpretations of the nominal con-
vergence criteria, Portugal was a founding member of the Euro in 1999/2002. Ironically, 
a high price was paid and will probably continue to be paid for this success; a price which 
Portuguese society is only now beginning to fully understand. 
Before the 2007/2008 crisis, the Portuguese economy was already remarkably weak. 
GDP growth rates were below the European average over the entire previous fifteen 
years. Whether it was a coincidence or not, the fall in the growth rates stems back to 
the end of the 1990s, when the exchange rates were fixed for the 3rd stage of the EMU. 
PARTLY ON ITS OWN MERIT, AND PARTLY BECAUSE 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FLEXIBLE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NOMINAL 
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA, PORTUGAL WAS A 
FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE EURO IN 1999/2002. 
IRONICALLY, A HIGH PRICE WAS PAID AND WILL 
PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE PAID FOR THIS 
SUCCESS; A PRICE WHICH PORTUGUESE SOCIETY 
IS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO FULLY UNDERSTAND.
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Instead of converging, the country fell further behind the European average for GDP per 
capita – the main indicator of the populations’ standard of living. As of 2002, and now 
coinciding with the physical introduction of the Euro, non-compliance with the budget-
ary deficit below 3% became a chronic problem. As the 2007/2008 economic-financial 
crisis unfolded, the situation became dramatically worse, reaching its climax when the 
Portuguese State had to request an international loan of 78 billion Euros in 2011. 
The second risk involves a subject that is not officially part of European rhetoric: the 
power relationships within the European Union. Once we admit that strengthening 
European integration is, in itself, advantageous, it is important to reflect on how a 
federalising solution could be conceived and implemented. Basically, what should its 
precise form be? We will take the case of the broadest and most ambitious idea of 
European economic governance. Not only is there no official proposal that clearly 
outlines the discussion, but different meanings and appeals for the Southern and North-
ern EU countries are implicit from the outset. In countries like Portugal (Greece, Spain, 
etc.), traditional net beneficiaries of the European budget, it brings financial transfers 
to the minds of politicians and citizens. In almost thirty years of European integration, 
Portugal has never been a net contributor and, realistically, will not be so in the foresee-
able future. In other words, the idea of an EU of transfers is implicit when this subject 
is discussed. Another underlying idea is that of access to funding on international 
markets on similar conditions to Germany, the Netherlands or France, for example, 
through the issue of Eurobonds. Looking at the matter from the perspective of the 
Eurozone’s core countries (Germany, but also, to different degrees, Austria, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and partly France), which are traditional net contributors, 
European economic governance has other nuances. Even though the language used is 
similar, implicitly the design is another one; it is different from the one feeding the 
pro-European imagination of financial solidarity for southern countries. The idea evoked 
is above all a logic of budgetary discipline and public accounts, following a pattern 
close to the one already used in those countries, as the ideas advanced by Germany’s 
Angela Merkel demonstrate. 
Economic and budgetary federalism does not necessarily mean a significant increase 
in the European Union’s financial transfers, nor that Eurobonds are automatically 
issued, which would reduce the southern countries’ funding costs on the market. Its 
most important feature may be the mandatory adoption of economic policies by all 
Eurozone members. In other words, although it would indeed provide greater European 
economic and political integration, it may become an instrument of the dominant vision 
of a restricted group of «directory powers». Recalling the aforementioned examples of 
classic federalism, we see that any significant increase in integration entails a funda-
mental problem due to the characteristics of the current EU28. A «Hamiltonian 
moment»31 is highly unlikely to come about in the current context. The political units 
are vastly different in size, and this is aggravated by substantial economic heterogeneity. 
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In demographic terms, and taking the extremes, there are 81.5 million people in Ger-
many which is 163 time larger than Malta’s population of 0.5 million. This is not an 
exceptional case. Enormous disparities are also found in the following political units: 
France’s population of 64 million people is more than 106 times larger than that of 
Luxembourg with 0.6 million; and Italy’s population is more than 81 times larger than 
that of Cyprus, with 61 million and 0.75 million inhabitants, respectively. And when 
the EU’s biggest political units, such as Germany and France, are compared with other 
medium-sized units, like Portugal or the Czech Republic (countries with similar-sized 
populations), Germany is 7.7 times bigger and France 6 times. 
The obvious and unwelcome question is this: in light of the (extreme) heterogeneity of 
the political units forming the European Union, is it possible to advance towards some 
sort of federalism based essentially on a logic of equality and solidarity, in which the 
large political units would agree to reducing their power and sharing more wealth 
through European budgetary mechanisms? The answer is that it is extremely unlikely, 
at least in the current circumstances. The smaller or average-sized political units (Cyprus, 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, etc.), are undoubtedly weakened by the crisis and by their 
(over)indebtedness. In terms of the negotiating power required to obtain a good deal 
on European economic governance or other economic federalism solutions, the time 
is not right. Portugal’s already minimal influence on European matters, even in normal 
conditions, has been reduced to zero by its enormous dependence on foreign funding. 
Based on the arguments herein, in the current context, there is a real risk that a solution of 
economic and budgetary federalism would in practice be close to the logic of the «directory 
of powers». Indeed, there are signs that it is not a European Union with greater equality and 
solidarity that is emerging. Another European Union threatens to emerge under the guise 
of providing pro-European federalist solutions. With the façade of a European economic 
government, or some other, in this European Union, a restricted number of core States could 
acquire institutional powers and legitimacy to define broad mandatory guidelines. An in-
depth discussion on which political choice to make is therefore of the utmost importance, 
and we must put a stop to empty clichés such as the need for «more Europe».
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